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We propose a two-country monopolistic competition model of business service offshoring 
that captures the advantage conferred by time zone differences. We emphasize the role of the 
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or service offshoring). It is shown that the utilization of communication networks induces a 
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moving costs for entrepreneurs, technological improvements and the resulting increase in 
service offshoring may reduce a country’s welfare. 
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Oﬀshoring of information and communication technology (ICT) services and
business process outsourcing (BPO, which includes call centers, data en-
try ﬁrms, and other back-oﬃce operations) are revolutionizing international
trade in services, which do not require physical shipments of products.1 The
past decade has seen substantial growth in international outsourcing (oﬀ-
shoring) of business services, admittedly from a low baseline (Amiti and
Wei, 2005, 2009, Head, Mayer and Ries, 2009). It is well recognized that the
utilization of new types of communication network (e.g., the Internet) plays
a major role in these trends.2 The rise of India’s software industry provides
a prime example. The programming problems of some U.S. corporations are
e-mailed to India at the end of the U.S. workday. Indian software engineers
work on them during their regular oﬃce hours and provide solutions.3 By
t h et i m et h eo ﬃces reopen in the U.S., the solutions have already arrived,
mainly as e-mail attachments. Ireland, pitching to host Europe’s main in-
t e r n a t i o n a lc a l lc e n t e r s ,o ﬀers another example. Cairncross (1997, p. 219)
emphasizes the rise of the call-center service industry in Ireland, which is
taking geographical advantage of being between the U.S. and Europe.
These types of business service oﬀshoring require two basic conditions.
F i r s t l y ,t h e r em u s tb ead i ﬀerence in time zones between the trading part-
ners: having a wide time zone diﬀerence makes it possible for a company
to operate a 24-hour business day. Second, there must be good connections
via communication networks which enable the business service to be “trans-
1In what follows, for brevity, we will refer to both ICT services and BPO as “business
services.” Also, we use the term “oﬀshoring” to denote the outsourcing of business services
to foreign locations.
2Freund and Weinhold (2002) found that Internet penetration, as measured by the
number of Internet hosts in a country, has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on service
trade. See also Hanley and Ott (2009).
3A c c o r d i n gt oar e c e n tM c K i n s e yr e p o r t ,I n d i ac ontributed about two-thirds of global
ICT outsourcing and about a half of global BPO oﬀshoring in 2004 (The Economist,J u n e
3-9, 2006).
3ported” quickly with little marginal cost. Thanks to the communication
revolution, time zone diﬀerences can become a primary driving force behind
service oﬀshoring. To provide an adequate assessment of the rise of business
service oﬀshoring one must not neglect the division of business activities
across diﬀerent time zones.
R e l a t i v e l yf e wa t t e m p t sh a v ebe e nm a d et om od e lt h er o l eo ft i m ez o n ed i f -
ferences in business service oﬀshoring. In a pioneering paper, Marjit (2007)
examined the role of international time zone diﬀerences in a vertically in-
tegrated Ricardian framework under perfect competition. He showed that
time-diﬀerence emerges as an independent driving force of international trade
besides taste, technology and endowment.
Pursuing this line of research, we propose a two-country monopolistic
competition model of business service oﬀshoring that captures the advantage
c o n f e r r e db yt i m ez o n ed i ﬀerences.4 Following Marjit (2007), we consider
two countries located in diﬀerent time zones. Unlike Marjit who assumed
p e r f e c t l yc o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t s ,w ee x a m i n et h er o l eo ft i m ez o n ed i ﬀerences
under monopolistic competition. This formulation allows us to emphasize
the importance of a scarce factor, entrepreneurs, who decide whether to
produce business services domestically or to oﬀshore them.5 The degree
of substitutability between domestically provided services and oﬀshored ser-
vices plays an important role in our analysis. Furthermore, by introducing
diﬀerentiated business services, we will be able to analyze the impact of tech-
nological change on the expansion of oﬀshored service varieties.
4The fragmentation of production stages and of service provision has been studied
within a trade-theoretic framework by Jones and Kierkowski (1990, 2001), Grossman and
Helpman (2005), Long, Riezman and Soubeyran (2005), Do and Long (2008), Mitra and
Ranjan (2008). Feenstra and Spencer (2005) dealt with both theory and empirical analysis.
Spencer (2005) provided an excellent survey of the literature on outsourcing. Kikuchi and
Iwasa (2010) presented a diﬀerent type of monopolistic competition trade model with time
zone diﬀerences in which services are assumed to be a ﬁnal good.
5On role of entrepreneurship in international trade, see e.g., Yu (2002). Schmitt and Yu
(2001) developed a model with heterogeneous ﬁxed export costs, which can be interpreted
as diﬀerences in entrepreneurship.
4Our main building block is the concept of multi-stage production that
takes place in real time. For concreteness, consider a non-traded ﬁnal good in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y(H). We posit that the production of this good necessarily
involves two stages. The second-stage production, which can only be done in
H, takes one whole working day (say 12 hours) and consists of “assembling”
business services received at the beginning of the day. The ﬁrst-stage is the
production of various business services, each being provided by a specialised
ﬁrm. The provision of each business service also takes the whole working
date. Thus, to have a unit of the ﬁnal good ready in H on Tuesday evening,
the business services that it embodies must be produced during day time on
Monday in H,o ri nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y(F) on Monday evening (H’s time),
which is day time in F.
We assume the ﬁnal good producers value the continuity of production
activities. If they utilize domestic business services, on top of the price
they pay for them, they also incur an inconvenience cost (or “interest cost”)
because of the time lag between the provision of those services and their
assembling into the ﬁnal good. On the other hand, if they utilize oﬀshored
services there exists no time lag (or only a negligible one) between service
provision and the transformation.
In short, domestic delivery bears signiﬁcant time costs (i.e., discontinuity
of production processes). In contrast to this, the utilization of communication
networks allows the production of some business services in the foreign coun-
try with non-overlapping work hours. This, together with business service
transmission via networks, enables a quick delivery: this is a more eﬃcient
(i.e., non-disrupted) production process.6 Although this cost-saving feature
seems at odds with the usual assumption that foreign products are disad-
vantaged by transport costs, it captures the idea that ﬁnal-good producers
would like to have business services without discontinuity. In fact, a recent
empirical study by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2009) found that in OCS (“Other
6Harrigan and Venables (2006) and Hummels (2001) also considered the time element
in trade and discussed the uncertainty aspect of trade from a distant area.
5Commercial Services” in the OECD’s classiﬁcation) trade, the continuity ef-
fect (ability to operate around the clock) dominates the synchronization eﬀect
(need to coordinate during business hours).7
While oﬀshoring can beneﬁt from the technology-induced time-zone ad-
vantage, entrepreneurs that oﬀshore their business services have to incur
other costs which we call “moving costs.” This term represents the cost of
doing business in a foreign environment. For example, the entrepreneur must
learn how to deal with foreign bureaucrats, foreign legal system, and also in-
cur the signiﬁcant costs of development of interconnected communication
networks over vast distances.8 Some authors regard such cost as ﬁxed costs
of oﬀshoring (Do and Long, 2008, Mitra and Ranjan, 2008). We ﬁnd it more
plausible to treat them as a “leakage” in the proﬁt ﬂow of the oﬀshored
business. While the reduction in delivery costs made possible by taking ad-
vantage of time zone diﬀerences has a positive eﬀect on proﬁt, the moving
costs due oﬀshoring have a negative eﬀect. The overall eﬀects of oﬀshoring
are determined by the tension between these countervailing eﬀects.
Using a model based on the ideas outlined above, we will show that the
utilization of communication networks induces a dramatic change in indus-
trial structure due to entrepreneurial relocation to take advantage of time
zone diﬀerences. Concerning the welfare eﬀects of service oﬀshoring, there
are some interesting results. Given the existence of moving costs for entre-
preneurs, we will show that a technological improvement in communication
and the resulting increase in service oﬀshoring may reduce a country’s wel-
fare, even though it is individually rational for each entrepreneur to choose
to oﬀshore services and to take advantage of time zone diﬀerences.
In Section 2 we present the basic model. In Section 3 we deal with the
eﬀects of technological change on service oﬀshoring and welfare. Section 4
provides some concluding remarks.
7Freeman (2002) and Jones et al. (2005) also emphasized the role of time zone diﬀer-
ences as a determinant of eﬃcient worldwide division of labor.
8The diﬃculty of of doing business across borders also suggests the importance of
business and social networks. See Rauch (2001) for a survey.
62 The Model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. They are located in diﬀerent
time zones and there is no overlap in daily working hours: when Home’s
daytime working hours end, Foreign daytime working hours begin (Figure
1).
In Home, there are E individuals, each owning one unit of labor and N/E
units of entrepreneurship. All individuals in Home have the same utility
function over two consumption goods: a nontradable Good X (which uses as
inputs a number of diﬀerentiated business services) and a tradable numeraire
Good Y .G o o dY is competitively produced under constant-returns-to-scale
technology, using labor as the only input. Assume the utility function is
u =l o gx + y, (1)
where x and y denotes the consumption of Good X and Good Y , respectively.
Let P denote the price of Good X,a n de denote the Home consumer’s
total expenditure on Good X.E q u a t i o n (1) c a nb ew r i t t e na su =l o ge −
logP + y. Maximizing this with the budget constraint e + y ≤ I, where I
denotes the individual’s income (which is the sum of her labor income and the
income from her entrepreneurship), we obtain e =1 . That is, each individual
spends e =1on Good X. Thus Home’s aggregate expenditure on Good X
is equal to the number of individuals, E.
In Home, Good X producers, who are perfectly competitive, buy busi-
ness services which they combine and transform into the ﬁnal good. This
transformation can only start after each business service provision has been
completed. The central assumption is that the continuity between business
service provision and ﬁnal good production is important: if there exists a lag
between those two activities, the values of business services are diminished.
Thus the timely delivery of business services is important.
Suppose there are two groups of services: domestically produced services
with an aggregator denoted by h,a n do ﬀshored services which utilize For-
eign’s daytime work (together with international communication networks)











where ε>1 is the elasticity of substitution between groups, Xi (i = h, f)i s
the quantity index of each group of services, and αh/αf measures the relative
attractiveness of domestically provided services. The corresponding unit cost














where Pi is the price index for group i services. Since Good-X producers are
perfectly competitive, the unit cost function P is exactly equal to the price
of Good X. Cost-minimization by ﬁnal good X producers implies that the












Recall that Good X is not internationally traded. The value of sectoral
output of the non-traded Good X is PX, which must equal the total expen-
diture on it, E
PX = E
which is constant and equals the number of individuals in Home.










where σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of services
w i t h i nt h es a m eg r o u p ,xi(j) is the quantity of service j in group i,a n d
[0,n i] represents group i’s range of varieties. The corresponding price index









8where pi(j) is the price of service j in group i.







In each group, diﬀerentiated business services are produced by monopolis-
tically competitive service ﬁrms. One of the central assumptions is that each
service ﬁrm needs to be set up and managed by one unit of entrepreneurship.
Since each individual provides N/E units of entrepreneurship, there are N
units of entrepreneurships in Home.9 Each entrepreneur has to decide what
type of business service to provide. They have two options: (1) to set up
a domestic ﬁrm by hiring Home labor at the wage rate wh and provide a
service h for Home Good-X producers; or (2) to set up an intermediary and
utilize Foreign’s daytime labor at the wage rate wf and, via communication
network, provide service f for Home Good-X producers.10 Note that the
wage rates in both countries are exogenously given by the labor productivity
in Good Y sector. It is assumed that Foreign does not have any business
service ﬁrms of its own, and does not have demand for business services. Any
business service variety produced in Foreign is made possible only by Home
entrepreneurs that set up intermediaries to take advantage of time zone dif-
ferences. As in Martin and Ottaviano (1999), the operating proﬁts in Foreign
(i.e., the rewards for entrepreneurs who decide to oﬀshore) are assumed to
be repatriated to Home.
To produce one unit of service, one unit of labor (with one working day)
is required. Given a Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation with constant elasticity σ,
and the wage rate wi,e a c hs e r v i c eﬁrm in group i (i = h,f) sets its “mill




,i = h,f. (8)
9In what follows, an “entrepreneur” means “one unit of entrepreneurship.”
10In what follows, we use the terms “service oﬀshoring" and “the utilization of time
zone diﬀerences via communication networks" interchangeably.
9where σ/(σ −1) is the mark-up factor. While Home ﬁnal good-X producers
pay ρi per unit of service from source i (i = h,f), the actual cost to them
is greater by a factor ti because of inconvenience cost arising from the lag
between the completion time of the service provider and the time the service
is actually utilized as an input in ﬁnal good production.11 Thus, from the
view point of Home Good-X producers, the full cost of a unit of service i is
pi = tiρi,i = h,f.
Bearing in mind the time element of the model, we can interpret (ti − 1)/ti
as a rate of discount.
Recall that our key assumption is that domestic service production re-
quires one workday and that the second-stage production can only begin
the following workday. Thus domestic service delivery bears signiﬁcant time
costs. In comparison, oﬀshored services, as soon as they are completed, are
immediately usable due to the utilization of rapid communication networks
(Figure 1). In other words, oﬀshored services whose production beneﬁts from
time zone diﬀerences realize higher value (or lower discount rate) than domes-
tically produced services. Interestingly, this assumption is contrary to the
familiar “trade cost” of the standard monopolistic competition model which
penalizes ﬁrms that ship goods from the periphery to the center. However,
it seems only natural that ﬁnal goods producers would like to have services
sooner than later.
We treat the improvement of communication networks as a reduction in
delivery costs of oﬀshored services (tf) . L e tu sd e n o t et h ed e l i v e r yc o s to f
oﬀshored services before the technological change by t1
f a n dd e n o t et h a ta f t e r
the change by t2
f. We assume the following condition holds:
t
1
f >t h >t
2
f ≥ 1. (9)
11There is an obvious parallel between this formulation of inconvenience costs and the
ice-berg transportation costs in the standard trade model that generates the well-known
home market eﬀect. According to the ice-berg formulation, for every ti (ti > 1) units
shipped, only one unit arrives.
10Note that this eﬀect comes not from lower production costs in Foreign but
from faster delivery. In the next section, we examine the impact of techno-
logical improvement in communication technologies, which is captured by a
reduction in tf.




PiXi,i = h,f. (10)




































Assume σ>ε(i.e., substitutability within a group is greater than between
groups). The ratio of proﬁts is thus inversely proportional to the ratio of
number of service varieties.12
Suppose that to become an oﬀshored business service provider, an entre-
preneur must incur moving cost. These costs include, for example, the ﬁxed
costs of interconnection and of setting up intermediaries, as well as the costs
of dealing with foreign bureaucrats.13 To represent these additional moving
costs, we assume that when an entrepreneur moves from group h to group f,
her net earning is only a fraction 1/(1+δ) of the proﬁti nt h en e ws e c t o r .T h e
other fraction, δ/(1+δ), represents “leakages,”or deadweight losses. The case
δ =0corresponds to the usual monopolistic competition model (Matsuyama
1995).
To oﬀset these moving costs, proﬁts of service-f provider must be higher
compared to service-h provider. Thus, in the long run, the following equilib-
12See Matsuyama (1995, p. 714) on this point.
13Kikuchi (2003) discusses implications of the interconnection of communication net-
works. Hanley and Ott (2009) argue that the costs of incomplete contracts, plus monitor-
ing and search costs also constitute a signiﬁcant part of costs of oﬀshoring.
11rium condition must hold:
(1 + δ)˜ πh =˜ πf, (12)
where the “tilde” indicates the long-run equilibrium value. In other words,
the costs of communicating across national borders are oﬀset by the advan-
tages of quicker delivery. In the long run, the distribution of service ﬁrms is
determined by the movement of entrepreneurs such that (12) holds.
Figure 2 shows the determination of the relative number of service ﬁrms
in the long run. The horizontal axis shows the relative number of service
ﬁrms (nf/nh), while the vertical axis shows the relative proﬁt level (πh/πf).
Given that σ>ε , equation (11) is shown as a downward-sloping curve.
Suppose the initial position is at point I. Then some entrepreneurs will
move from group h to group f. In the long run, the equilibrium is obtained
at point E, the intersection of the curve representing (11) and the line (1 +
δ)˜ πh =˜ πf. The long-run relative size of service oﬀshoring (measured in terms



















Proposition 1: In the long run, the share of business service oﬀshoring
is positively related to its relative attractiveness (αf/αh) and negatively re-
lated to both its relative costs (inclusive of delivery costs ti) and the costs of
movement δ.
This implies that, without sophisticated communication networks, a strong
preference in favor of domestically provided services and the existence of
signiﬁcant costs of movement would result in a low long run level of service
oﬀshoring.
123 The Impact of a Technological Advance in
Communication Networks
3.1 Proﬁts
In this section, we examine the impact of a technological advance in commu-
n i c a t i o nt e c h n o l o g i e s ,w h i c hi sc a p t u r e db yar e d u c t i o ni nd e l i v e r yc o s t stf







Let rh denote the cost (to ﬁnal good producers) of the bundle of do-




























where the hat denotes the percentage rate of change. Hence a reduction in tf
increases the buyer’s relative input cost rh. In order to examine the impact of
a technological advance, it is useful to express the proﬁt level of each service



















































In the short run nf and nh are ﬁxed, hence the changes in proﬁt levels
come only from the change in the relative expenditure share induced by a















By shifting expenditure away from domestically produced services, a reduc-
tion in delivery costs of oﬀshored service tf increases the proﬁto fg r o u p - f
ﬁrms, while reducing the proﬁt of group-h ﬁrms. In Figure 2, this change is
shown as an upward shift of the downward-sloping curve (i.e., from point E
to point I0).
Suppose that before the technological advance, nf is smaller than nh
because the initial tf is high. Then we can prove the following result:
Proposition 2: In the short run, given that nf <n h, the change in each
group-f ﬁrm’s proﬁt due to technological change is larger (in absolute value)
than the change in each group-h ﬁrm’s proﬁt:
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂πf
∂tf
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂πh
∂tf
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯.
In the intermediate run, entrepreneurs respond to the change in relative
proﬁt, and gradually move from group h to group f, which results in increased
service oﬀshoring. This is shown as a move from point I0 to E0 in Figure 2.
It tends to reduce the proﬁto fg r o u p - f ﬁrms. Note that the increase in the
number of oﬀshored services causes a second-round reduction in the price
index Pf. Since the range of oﬀshored services has widened, the bundle of
oﬀshored services becomes more attractive to Home ﬁnal-good producers.
14From (14) and (15), the relative cost of group h increases with nf,a n d
mitigates the negative eﬀect on πf of an increasing number of service ﬁrms
in group f. The bigger is the inter-group substitution  , the larger is this
eﬀect.
Now let us consider the change in the long-run proﬁt levels. From (10),
one obtains




Given that (1+δ)˜ πh =˜ πf holds in the long run, we can obtain the proﬁtf o r
each group-h ﬁrm as follows:
˜ πh =
(E/σ)





This implies that the long-run proﬁt of each group-h ﬁrm is decreasing in
the level of group-f’s delivery costs. As tf falls, it becomes more proﬁtable
for entrepreneurs to switch location, and to take advantage of time zone
diﬀerences. Since oﬀshored service providers earn higher (gross) proﬁts in
the long-run equilibrium, this switch tends to reduce the proﬁto fr e m a i n i n g
group-h service providers.
Proposition 3: In the long run, from each group-h ﬁrm’s viewpoint, the neg-
ative eﬀect of technological change is magniﬁed due to entrepreneurs’ switch-
ing from home services toward oﬀshored services.
The gradual switching of entrepreneurs results in increased service oﬀshoring:
more entrepreneurs utilize time zone diﬀerences as a result of improved com-
munication networks.
3.2 Welfare
Now let us examine the welfare eﬀects of a technological change that results in
af a l li ntf. Let us begin by examining the short-run eﬀect of the technological
change. In the short run, the number of services in each group is constant.
15Diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to tf yields, after making use of (14) and (15)










1−  > 0. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the price of Good X immediately becomes lower
after the technological change.
Next let us consider the aggregate net proﬁt for Home entrepreneurs.
Using (16) and (17),













Thus, diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to tf yields, we obtain the short-run













Equations (21) and (24) show that in the short run, there are two con-
ﬂicting eﬀects on welfare. On the one hand, lower delivery costs leads to
lower ﬁnal good price, increasing consumers’ welfare. On the other hand,
increasing the group-f ﬁrms’ gross proﬁts leads to reduced aggregate net
proﬁtw h e nt h el e a k a g eo fo ﬀshore proﬁts is positive (δ>0). The larger the
leakage parameter δ, the greater the negative impact of technological change
on total proﬁts.

























16Next, let us consider the long-run impact of the technological change, af-
ter the relocation of entrepreneurs has taken place to equalize the net returns
to entrepreneurship. Since some group-h ﬁrms switch to group-f status, the
number of oﬀshored services increases. This induces a further reduction in
the price P (see (15)): with an enlarged range of oﬀshored services, the
price of Good X becomes lower still, which increases the welfare gains for
consumers. At the same time, however, increased switching implies greater
aggregate moving costs, hence a negative impact on total net proﬁts (and
hence consumers’ income). Thus, if moving costs are suﬃciently high, the
technological change and the resulting increase in service oﬀshoring may ac-
tually cause welfare to fall because the eﬃciency eﬀect of lower delivery costs
is dominated by the increased waste due to moving costs. Hence, the success-
ful movement of some entrepreneurs, while a proﬁt-maximizing move from
their viewpoint, is not Pareto-improving from the viewpoint of the country
as a whole.
Let us examine the change in consumers’ utility level. From (1), the
indirect utility function of each individual is given as follows:15





















The plot of u with respect to 1/tf (i.e., the degree of technological change)
is shown in Figure 3.16 T h i sc u r v ei si n v e r t e dUs h a p e df o raw i d er a n g eo f
reasonable parameter values.
Proposition 4: In the presence of moving costs for entrepreneurs, a country
may suﬀer a welfare loss as a result of an increase in service oﬀshoring
induced by a technological advance in communication networks.
15Note that e =1 . Furthermore, to simplify the mathematical expressions, we set
wh =1without loss of generality.
16Parameter values for Figure 3 are as follows: wh = wf =1 , th =1 , αf = αh =1 ,
  =2 , σ =1 .5, N =1 .
17The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the initial level of deliv-
ery costs tf is high, then the share of oﬀshored services is relatively small
(see (13)) and hence the negative impact of moving costs is relatively small.
In this case, the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates and the technological change in-
creases welfare. If the level of delivery costs is suﬃciently lower, however,
the share of oﬀshored service becomes larger and an increase in wasteful use
of resources (i.e., moving costs) dominates the other favorable eﬀects. As a
result, a technological advance in the form of lowering delivery costs of oﬀ-
shored services and the resulting increased service oﬀshoring can be harmful.
Figure 3 also displays several cases with diﬀerent values of δ.A sδ becomes
larger, the curve representing the utility will shift down. This conﬁrms the
intuition that a greater leakage δ implies a larger negative eﬀect of increased
wastes.17
Our result on welfare is in sharp contrast to popular discussions about
the winners of service oﬀshoring. Many people would think that the winners
of service oﬀshoring are owners of ﬁrms (i.e., entrepreneurs) that oﬀshore
services. Given the existence of moving costs, however, service oﬀshoring
by Home entrepreneurs may worsen the welfare of Home and reduce the
net proﬁts of all entrepreneurs, even though it is individually rational for
entrepreneurs to choose to oﬀshore in order to take advantage of international
time zone diﬀerences.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this study, by constructing a simple model of service oﬀshoring under mo-
nopolistic competition, we have examined how a technological change that
results in a decline in delivery costs of oﬀshored services aﬀe c td o m e s t i ce n -
17It may be worth noting that there is a parallel between the present model and the
“reciprocal dumping” trade model of Brander and Krugman (1983) which also emphasizes
both the positive pro-competive eﬀect of trade liberalization and negative eﬀect associated
with increased aggregate transport cost.
18trepreneurs’ oﬀshoring decisions to take advantage of international time zone
diﬀerences. We have demonstrated that, as the delivery costs of oﬀshored
services become lower, more entrepreneurs choose to utilize communication
networks and provide oﬀshored services. Also, in the presence of costs of
movements, the impact of technological change on proﬁt levels becomes larger
as more entrepreneurs switch to become oﬀshored service providers.
Furthermore, we have shown that there are conﬂicting eﬀects of a tech-
nological change on welfare. While eﬃcient utilization of oﬀshored services
(taking advantage of time zone diﬀerences) has a direct positive impact on
welfare, the increased waste in entreprenuers’ movement has a negative im-
pact. Our analysis indicates that a technological advance which leads to in-
creased service oﬀshoring may actually reduce welfare because the eﬃciency
eﬀect is dominated by the increased waste due to moving costs. Service
oﬀshoring with time zone diﬀerences is not necessarily proﬁt-enhancing in
equilibrium, even though it is individually rational for each entrepreneur to
take advantage of time zone diﬀerences.
The present analysis must be regarded as very tentative. Hopefully it
provides a stimulus for studying how a technological advance (or trade lib-
eralization) aﬀects both the degree of service oﬀshoring and welfare.
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